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Introduction 
The vast sums of capital invested by the British in overseas enterprises in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries has been the focus of more than a century of economic 
discourse.  Beginning with J. A. Hobson’s theory of oversavings as the motivation for 
capital export and imperialism as its consequence, scholars have long disputed both the 
cause and the effects of the unprecedented flow of capital from a single nation into 
enterprises beyond its borders. While exact estimates of British overseas investment in 
the 19th century vary,  there is general agreement that by 1914 Britain acquired a 
historically unprecedented position as a global creditor.1 Between 1865 and 1914 as 
much British investment went to Africa, Asia, and Latin America as to the United 
Kingdom itself.2 Between 4 to 8 percent of GNP was being sent out of the country by 
British investors in the years 1871—1913, a number significantly higher than that for 
other developed nations at the time.3  
When a country sends a substantial amount of its financial capital abroad, a 
natural question arises whether these capital exports hurt the development of the industry 
at home.4 For example, Kennedy argues based on certain assumptions, that a diversion of 
                                                 
1 Morgan and Thomas estimate that during one hundred year period, 1815—1914 the total British 
investment overseas amounted to ₤4,000 million, compared to British GDP of ₤2.5 billion in 1914. 
Morgan, E. Victor, and W. A. Thomas, 1962, The Stock Exchange, Its History and Functions, London: 
Elek Books, p. 79. 
2 Davis, L. E. and R. A. Huttenback, Mammon and the pursuit of empire: the political economy of British 
imperialism, 1860—1912 (Cambridge, 1986), p. 46. 
3 Pollard, Sidney, 1985, “Capital Exports, 1870—1914: Harmful or Beneficial?” Economic History Review 
38, 489—514.  
4 A general discussion of British industrial development and its relation to the British expansion overseas is 
contained in several works of Cain and Hopkins. Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins, 1980, “The Political 
Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750—1914,” Economic History Review, 33 pp. 463—490. Cain, 
P. J., and A. G. Hopkins, 1986, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas I. The Old 
Colonial System, 1688—1850,” Economic History Review, 39 pp. 501—525. Cain, P. J., and A. G. 
Hopkins, 1987, “Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II. New imperialism, 1850—
1945,” Economic History Review, 40 pp. 1—26.  Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins, 1994, British Imperialism, 
London: Longman. 
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capital from overseas to home purposes would have added 25—50 per cent to the British 
national income. Crafts, on more restrictive assumptions, made it 25 per cent.5 If this 
indeed was the case, then Britain would have enjoyed a higher standard of living had 
Victorian investors allocated a larger proportion of their portfolio to domestic issues. To 
explain why investment abroad was so large if it was beneficial to invest at home some 
scholars laid the blame on the City of London with its perceived propensity to channel 
capital abroad. The proponents of this market failure hypothesis argue that London’s 
capital markets discriminated against domestic industry in favor of overseas 
investments.6 Ripley describes these views and responds to them eloquently:   
“British capital … was being used to develop foreign and colonial 
industries which were to prove serious competitors with the industries of 
Britain, competitive at first in particular areas and then throughout the 
world. … The flow of capital abroad might perhaps have been better 
directed, but a little reflection shows that nothing could have been gained 
in the long run by restricting capital investment to within the home 
country. The development of competing industries abroad would not have 
been prevented. Capital for that purpose would have been forthcoming 
from elsewhere; the trickle might have been slower and thinner, but the 
ultimate result would have been the same.”7  
 
Thus, in one view, overseas investment hurt Britain by creating a shortage of 
capital for the domestic industry. Not being a supporter of any simplified opinion on the 
matter of capital exports, Pollard writes: 
“An exactly opposite view is taken by neo-classical theory, which 
assumes, equally dogmatically, that capital exports must have been 
beneficial, since they would not have been undertaken had returns from 
                                                 
5 Kennedy, William, 1982, “Economic Growth and Structural Change in the United Kingdom, 1870--
1914,” Journal of Economic History, 42 pp. 87-118. Crafts, N. F. R., 1979, “Victorian Britain Did Fail,” 
Economic History Review, 32. 
6 O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999, review and critique the capital market failure view of British overseas 
investment. O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999, Globalization and History: The Evolution of a Nineteenth-
Century Atlantic Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
7 Ripley, Percy, 1934, A Short History of Investment, London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons, pp. 161—163. 
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abroad not been higher than expected returns from home investment; thus 
they served to raise total British national income.”8  
 
 There is a closely related literature on the profitability of investment in British 
empire. For example, Offer studies the question of whether the British empire was an 
asset or a liability.9 The debate is focused on whether the empire produced economic 
returns higher than investments in Britain itself and whether these higher returns justified 
the cost of maintaining the empire, including the cost of defense. To measure returns, 
Offer cites the evidence presented by Edelstein and by Davis and Huttenback that 
overseas investment produced a higher risk-adjusted rate of return than British domestic 
securities. Offer discusses the costs of British defense at some length and concludes that 
these costs, contrary to the beliefs and conclusions of Davis and Huttenback, were not 
excessive and can be rationalized. Overall, he concludes that “overseas investment paid 
for its defense and left a substantial margin of profit.” When discussing the benefits of the 
empire, Offer convincingly argues that the empire was a source of utility from items such 
as status goods, the privilege of management and control, and the opportunity for 
emigration.10 Although focused on the strategic benefits of investment in the empire, 
Offer’s arguments are directly related to consumption smoothing and risk-sharing: 
“Canadian wheat stood between Britain and starvation in 1917…”11  
 The debate on the costs and benefits of international investing is frequently 
focused on the rates of return of domestic and overseas assets. If returns on overseas 
investments are expected to be higher than on domestic issues, then a rational investor 
                                                 
8 Pollard, Sidney, 1985, “Capital Exports, 1870—1914: Harmful or Beneficial?” Economic History Review 
38, 495. 
9 Offer, Avner, 1993, “The British Empire, 1870—1914: a waste of money?” Economic History Review 46, 
pp. 215—238 
10 Offer, 1993, pp. 232—233. 
11 Offer, 1993, p. 235. 
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would purchase foreign assets. To study this, Edelstein constructs a sample of 566 
common and preferred stocks and bonds, domestic, colonial, and foreign, between 1870 
and 1913 and computes realized rates of return. He concludes that on average, for the 
years 1870—1913, the United Kingdom’s holdings of overseas portfolio investments 
realized a higher, price-deflated rate of return than their holdings of domestic portfolio 
investments.12 Davis and Huttenback compute rates of return from company accounting 
records. These data are taken from the records of 482 British firms, operating either at 
home, in the empire, or in the rest of the world. Like Edelstein, they find that overall, 
from 1860 to 1912, British firms operating in the empire had higher returns than domestic 
enterprises, and also outperformed British companies operating overseas outside the 
empire.13 
 Edelstein argues that the risk of foreign and domestic assets is not the same and 
computes risk-adjusted returns. Using a form of the Capital Asset Pricing Model to adjust 
for the co-movement of international stocks with a domestic index,  he finds  that foreign 
equities returned a significant 1.58% per annum more than domestic equities over the 
period 1870-1913.14 
 An approach that is focused on rates of return, either raw or corrected for 
exposure to systematic risk via the CAPM does not use all the information contained in 
returns on domestic and foreign assets. Returns also contain information on the degree of 
correlation between different investments, and therefore, on the diversification benefits 
                                                 
12 Edelstein, M., Overseas investment in the age of high imperialism: the United Kingdom, 1850—1914 
(New York, 1982). Data is described in Chapter 5. 
13 Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 107. One limitation of their study, is that it does not allow a true 
comparison between home and overseas investment, because it consists exclusively of British firms. It does 
not account for differences in performance between British and overseas management, especially when the 
overseas management managed on its home turf. 
14 Pollard, 1985, p. 496. 
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available to individual investors. In this paper we explore this important dimension of the 
data using Modern Portfolio Theory. Simply put, capital was invested abroad because 
many individual investors made a decision to invest in foreign assets. Our goal is to take 
into account expected returns, risks, and diversification opportunities simultaneously to 
we-revisit the question of whether these decisions were individually rational and if so, to 
what extent did the British investor benefited from international investing.15  
The discussion of the benefits of overseas investment and of financial risk sharing 
can be enhanced and formalized by using mean-variance optimization techniques of the 
MPT. Modern portfolio theory assumes that investor preferences can be represented by a 
utility function defined over the expected return and variance of a portfolio return. 
Rational investors form portfolios that have the smallest variance for every level of 
expected return. In doing so, they take into account expected returns of assets in their 
investment opportunity set, as well as asset variances and co-variances between different 
investments.  
 In this study we use the data on returns on domestic and foreign assets compiled 
by Edelstein.16 Our findings, therefore, can be compared to the results obtained by other 
researchers whose main focus is on the return characteristics of these data series. We 
argue that it is important to bring co-variance between asset classes into the picture. We 
document and quantify the benefits of international investments available to British 
investors in the late nineteenth century. 
                                                 
15 Several classic international asset pricing models are focused on the portfolio problem of domestic 
investors: Black (1974), Stulz (1981a, 1981b), Errunza and Losq (1985), and Eun and Janakiramanan 
(1986). For a corporate finance perspective see Errunza and Senbet (1981), Stulz (1999b), Stulz and 
Wasserfallen (1995), Errunza and Miller (2000). 
16 See the description of annual return series on various asset classes in Edelstein 1982, Chapter 5. 
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 Our analysis suggests that diversification is an important explanation for British 
investors’ overseas investments. Mean variance analysis shows that given expected 
returns, variances and co-variances among domestic and foreign assets, rational investors 
maximizing expected return for a given level of risk should have taken advantage of the 
diversification opportunities and include foreign asset classes in their portfolios. 
Estimates of British actual overseas investment, as a percentage of total investment range  
from 28 per cent by Hobson (1914) and Feis (1930) to 47.7 per cent by Edelstein (1982), 
with an average estimate of approximately 34 per cent.17 Our results for the optimal 
portfolio weights from mean-variance analysis are surprisingly close to these. For 
example, when we consider eleven UK equity asset classes and four world-wide equity 
asset classes, the optimal portfolio given reasonable assumptions about investor risk  
aversion includes 38 per cent investment overseas.18 
 To highlight the role of diversification, we perform the following experiment. We 
maintain the correlation matrix and the standard deviations of all asset classes, but set  the 
expected return on each foreign asset class equal to that of the corresponding UK asset 
class. Since returns on UK asset classes are lower during the time period of study,  this 
effectively penalizes investment abroad. Even with this penalty, we find that it is still 
optimal to include foreign assets in the portfolio and take advantage of the diversification 
opportunities that investing overseas offers. A review of the financial literature of the 
period also suggests that British investors understood benefits of international 
diversification. Overall, evidence suggests that capital export was a consequence of 
opportunity and understanding of diversification. 
                                                 
17 Pollard, 1985, p. 491. 
18 The results are presented in Table 10 and discussed in a later section of the paper. 
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The British Securities Market 
British Investment Overseas 
 The difficulty of obtaining precise measurements of overseas investment is well 
known. Estimates based on new issues made in London may be wrong, because foreign 
investors could, and often did, subscribe to issues made in London, and British investors 
could, and did, subscribe to issues made in overseas markets. Similar arguments apply to 
using nominal or market values of securities quoted in London. To obtain figures for 
overseas investment, economic historians supplement the information on securities issued 
and quoted in London with funds flow data, and with the estimates of the investment 
income derived from overseas. Whatever the method used, there is an agreement that a 
substantial amount of capital was sent by British investors to foreign countries during the 
period from 1870 to 1913.19 Foreign investment, however, can be traced to earlier days of 
international trade and finance. 
 From the early days of finance, investors pursued international investments. The 
earliest known joint-stock company in Britain was the Russia Company. It was formed in 
1553 by a group of London merchants to send an expedition to seek for a North-East 
passage to China and Indies.20 The ships reached Archangel, and in 1555 the Company 
secured a charter giving it a monopoly of trade in Russia. Investors in the Company were 
                                                 
19 The challenges of obtaining the estimates of British overseas investment are also discussed in Platt, D.C., 
1980, “British Portfolio Investment Overseas Before 1870: Some Doubts,” Economic History Review 33, 
pp. 1—16. 
20 Ripley, Percy, 1934, A Short History of Investment, London: Sir Isaac Pitman and Sons. 
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not making an international investment in the strictest sense, because their capital was not 
all deployed abroad. Nonetheless, the risks that the Company faced were international in 
nature.  
 Another important early example of a chartered company was the East India 
Company, also an international trade enterprise. Joint-stock companies were formed for 
the colonization of Virginia (1606), Bermuda (1611), Guiana (1619), New England 
(1620), and Nova Scotia (1621).21 By 1620 the East India Company had nearly a 
thousand shareholders and a subscribed stock of ₤1,629,000.22 The first foreign 
government loan was floated in London in 1706 on behalf of the Emperor of Germany 
for ₤500,000, secured on the revenues of Silesia and bearing interest at 8 per cent.23 More 
financial landmarks followed—The South Sea Company (1711), the establishment of the 
Sinking Fund in England (1717), The South Sea Bubble (1720), and The Bubble Act that 
made the formation of joint stock companies a difficult and costly matter. In 1802 a new 
Stock Exchange was opened in Capel Court. 
The significant flow of British investment overseas began in the years after the 
French wars. Three issues of the French “rentes” were placed by Barings in London 
between 1815 and 1818. In the early 1820’s Rothschilds issued loans in London for 
Prussia and Russia. The republics of Central and South America also borrowed in 
London at that time. Between 1822 and 1825, Brazil and Peru each raised three loans; 
Mexico and Columbia, two; and Chile, the Argentine and Guatemala, one.24 Greece also 
placed a 5 per cent government bond in London at this time. With the exception of Brazil, 
                                                 
21 Morgan, E. Victor, and W. A. Thomas, 1962, The Stock Exchange, Its History and Functions, London: 
Elek Books, pp. 12—13. 
22 Ripley, 1934, p. 25. 
23 Ripley, 1934, p. 50. 
24 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 81. 
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all of the South American States soon defaulted. During the next fifteen years most 
foreign issues in London were from the United States. The amount of British investment 
in the United States around 1840 has been estimated between ₤22 million and ₤40 
million.25 
 Table 1 lists different types of securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange 
in 1843 and their nominal values. Loans to foreign governments represent 11% of the 
securities. In addition, there are private companies that can be clearly identified as 
international enterprises. Among them, there is the East India Company, the South Sea 
Company, and twenty four foreign mining companies. 
 Morgan and Thomas estimate that by the mid eighteen-fifties British overseas 
investments were over ₤200 million, and during the next twenty years they increased 
more than five-fold.26 Between 1860 and 1876 more then a hundred and fifty foreign 
government loans were issued in London and British investors are estimated to have 
provided ₤320 million in cash to these borrowers. This is more than two-and-a-half times 
the nominal amount of all foreign government debt in 1842. In addition, ₤160 million is 
estimated to have been invested in India and colonial governments and railways, and 
more than ₤230 million in companies operating abroad.27 This was the time of large 
outflow of British capital to India. The amount of capital invested in Indian railways 
alone from 1858 to 1869 was ₤70.1 million. Indian securities were widely held. On 
January 1, 1868 there were 49,690 shareholders and bondholders, practically all of whom 
                                                 
25 Ripley, 1934, pp. 76—79. 
26 For comparison, the total value of UK government debt was ₤832 million in 1850 and ₤775 in 1875. 
With UK population in 1877 being equal to 33,444,419 UK government debt equaled 23 pounds 5 shillings 
per head. Foreign investment by the mid-1870’s reached 29 pounds 18 shillings per person (the figures for 
UK population and UK debt are from The Investors’ Monthly Manual). 
27 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 88. 
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were residents of Great Britain.28 Other rapidly growing colonies also raised funds in 
Britain. Fifty million pounds were loaned between 1860 and 1876 to the governments in 
Australasia, mainly for railway construction and other infrastructure projects. Twenty-
five million more were loaned to the governments of Canada and smaller colonies.29 
 Investment overseas continued throughout the 1880’s. The amount of capital 
raised in 1888 was ₤160 million and another ₤190 million followed in 1890. Much of this 
capital went into South American shares, and the shares of mining companies in North 
America and Africa. The sum subscribed for mining ventures in 1888 was ₤52.5 million, 
and in 1889 ₤41 million.30 According to Ripley, estimated British capital abroad in 1885 
stood at ₤1,302,000 and reached ₤1,600 million in 1895.31 Table 2 shows the nominal 
value of foreign securities quoted on the London Stock Exchange at the beginning of 
1893. Of the total amount ₤1,368 million, foreign government securities represented 38% 
and colonial government securities represented 16%. These are the two largest asset 
classes. US Railways accounted for 8.8% and railways in India for another 4.75%. All 
railway securities accounted for 28.4% of the total investment overseas. 
 Another period of phenomenal growth in overseas investment was from 1905 to 
1914. Overall, well over ₤2,000 million was invested abroad between 1880 and 1914.32 
At the end of 1913, a total of ₤3,715 million was invested in overseas securities. 
Researchers agree that measured in absolute value or relative to national product, savings, 
                                                 
28 Jenks, 1927, pp. 219—220. 
29 Jenks, 1927, p. 231. There are 157 foreign loans listed in the table of foreign government loan issues in 
London from 1860 to 1876 compiled by Jenks. 
30 Ripley, 1934, pp. 151—152. Total value of UK government debt was ₤746 million in 1884 and ₤665 in 
1894. 
31 Ripley, 1934, p. 163. 
32 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 94, who cite the following source: Cairncross, A. K., 1953, Home and 
Foreign Investment, 1870—1913, Cambridge, p. 180. These figures are based on balance of payments 
estimates and are significantly lower than estimates of the amount of foreign assets in British ownership 
derived from income tax returns. 
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or wealth, British capital exports moved to unprecedented levels in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.33 
 Where was the money invested? Table 3 displays the geographical distribution of 
foreign investment, as well as the distribution of investment among different asset classes 
and industries. At the end of 1913, just under half of foreign investment was in the 
dominions and colonies, approximately 20% in the United States, and another 20% in 
Latin America, and 15% in Europe. U.S. new issues were 21 per cent of total new 
overseas issues, 1886—1913. Argentina was another significant importer of capital from 
the United Kingdom over the same years. Between 1870 and 1913 Argentina issues 
accounted for approximately 8 per cent of total overseas issues placed in the UK. 
Between 1870 and 1913 Australian new issues absorbed by the United Kingdom 
amounted to ₤325 million, approximately 8 per cent of total new overseas issues in the 
UK. Britain’s investment in new Canadian issues totaled 9.7 per cent of the total new 
issues taken up by the United Kingdom during 1870—1913.34 Distribution across various 
industries is also interesting:  40% of foreign investment was in railway securities, 30% 
in loans to foreign governments and municipalities, 5% in public utilities, 10% in mines 
and plantations, and about 8% in banks and financial institutions.35 
 
The Investment Opportunity Set 
 The overview of British overseas investment flows clearly indicates that the 
investors faced a rich set of foreign investment opportunities. By no means was this set 
                                                 
33 Edelstein, 1982, p. 25. 
34 Edelstein, 1982, pp. 102—104. 
35 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 80. Similar percentages are reported in Segal, Harvey H., and Matthew 
Simon, 1961, “British Foreign Capital Issues, 1865—1894,” Journal of Economic History 21, p. 575. See 
also Davis and Huttenback, 1986, Chapter 2. 
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static. It evolved with political changes around the world. Young Latin American states 
approached the British financial market early in their political development. Greece, too, 
borrowed in London when funds were needed to support the formation of a new political 
regime. Technological changes also affected the investment opportunity set. With the 
invention of the telegraph new companies were formed throughout the world laying 
telegraph cables and establishing the world-wide telecommunications network. Finally, 
infrastructure development placed large demands on the capital markets. British investors 
financed railroad construction throughout the world. Tracing the evolution of the 
investment opportunity set over several decades shows that foreign securities occupied an 
increasingly important role in the portfolio of a British investor, and illustrates that the 
investments also came from a wide range of industries and geographical regions, creating 
substantial diversification benefits. 
 The London Stock Exchange was both the world’s largest before 1914, and the 
most international. In 1903, S. S. Pratt, an American, noted that “The bonds of every 
Government, the stocks of every country, are traded in London,” and made a comparison 
with New York, where “Wall Street confines itself to the securities of the United States.” 
Only the Paris Bourse came close to London as an international financial center. 
London’s interest was worldwide, whereas Paris tended to trade in the securities of other 
European and Mediterranean countries.36  
 Integration between the London securities market and those abroad began in the 
eighteenth century when British securities were held extensively abroad, especially by the 
Dutch. At the beginning of the nineteenth century foreign holdings of British securities 
were reduced to small amounts and continued to decline. At the same time, British 
                                                 
36 Michie, 1987. 
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investors were beginning to hold foreign securities.37 By 1843 a total of ₤1,118 million 
(nominal values) of securities was known in London, and of these, at least ₤128 million, 
or 11.4%, were foreign (Table 1). By 1853, when the paid-up capital of securities quoted 
on the London Stock Exchange was ₤1,215 million, a total of ₤101 million, or 8.3 per 
cent, was foreign, with 70% issued by foreign governments and 30% by foreign railroad 
companies (Table 5). 
 The second half of the nineteenth century there was a significant growth in 
internationally held government debt issued by non-European countries. Table 4 lists 
government securities traded on the London Stock Exchange in 1869 and in 1890. There 
are 196 government bonds listed for 1869 and 250 for 1890. Canada, Brazil, Argentina 
and Australia raised funds to finance infrastructure development. In 1863, the nominal 
value foreign government securities quoted in London equaled ₤146.7 million, or 9 per 
cent of the total (which equaled ₤1,604 million). By 1883, the nominal value of foreign 
government securities quoted in London grew to ₤831.5, which equaled 22.8 per cent of 
the total of ₤3,641 million. Trading in the debt securities issued by countries such as 
Britain, France, Germany and the United States mostly took place on their own principal 
exchanges. However, it was not necessary for foreign debt to be exclusively held in 
Britain for it to be important from the point of view of a British investor. What was 
important was the fact that foreign debt could be purchased with relatively small 
transaction costs through a domestic securities exchange in London. 
 In addition to government issues, British investors had access to foreign corporate 
stocks and bonds (Tables 2 and 5). Securities issued by continental European railways 
and US railroad securities were two important asset classes. Depending on the source of 
                                                 
37 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 80. 
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data, in 1893 US railways accounted for 8.8% to 11% of the total nominal value of 
securities quoted in London. New issues of railroad securities were made available to 
British investors throughout the years. When the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe railroad 
made a new issue of $88 million 4 per cent bonds in 1896 it allocated 22.7 per cent to 
Amsterdam, 29.5 per cent to London and the remainder to New York.38 
 In addition to US railroad securities, the issues of railway companies from 
numerous other countries were also an important part of the British investors’ investment 
opportunity set. For example, 65 per cent of Canadian Pacific Railway shares were held 
in Britain. Of the ₤1.5 million loan placed by the Argentine North-Eastern Railway in 
1888, investors in Britain accounted for 62.5 per cent.39 
 Industries other than railroads were also represented on the London Stock 
Exchange by foreign stocks and bonds. These, for example, included securities issued to 
finance the development of copper mining in Spain, United States, and the gold-mining 
boom in South Africa in the 1890s.40 Other industries included banking, chemical 
industry, steel, manufacturing, telegraph (and later, telephone), gas and light, waterworks, 
and tramways—the latter five industries jointly often referred to as infrastructure 
securities. 
 The investment opportunity set continued to expand with the development of 
financial markets. Table 3 provides a summary of foreign investment opportunities 
available to a British investor at the end of the period of our study, in 1913. By this time 
foreign stocks and shares quoted in London had a nominal value of nearly ₤6,800 million, 
                                                 
38 Michie, 1987, p. 53. 
39 Michie, 1987, pp. 54—55. 
40 Harvey, Charles and Peter Taylor, 1987, “Mineral wealth and economic development: foreign direct 
investment in Spain, 1851—1913,” Economic History Review 40, pp. 185—207. 
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60% of the value of all quoted securities. Investors had access to securities issued within 
the empire, including Canadian, Indian, and Australasian securities. Investors could 
purchases stocks and bonds issued by North American and South American governments 
and corporations, as well as securities from all European states, the Middle East, Japan, 
and China. Overall, the investment opportunity set of a British investor at the end of 1913 
is a list of companies that occupies ninety pages of The Investor’s Monthly Manual, 
printed in a rather small font. The examination of this list shows that not only were the 
investors able to diversify their holding geographically, but they also could invest in 
different industries. Apart from government securities issued by colonial and foreign 
governments, there were stocks and bonds issued by foreign banks, breweries, canals and 
docks, mines, and railroads, as well numerous other industries. For example, the list 
contains 187 securities issued by American (US and Mexican) railway companies and 
240 by foreign railways (this number does not include Canadian and Indian railways 
which are listed separately). 
 British investors could invest in individual issues of stocks and bonds floated by 
foreign governments and commercial enterprises. The investors could also invest in 
overseas assets through investment trusts that acted as financial intermediaries similarly 
to today’s mutual funds. Investment trusts allowed smaller investors to hold diversified 
portfolios of foreign securities, thereby making investment abroad a more attractive 
proposition for British investors.  
 The concept of the investment trust company, or a mutual fund, received an 
increasing amount of attention and popularity during the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. The Scottish American Investment Co., Ltd., founded in 1873 was an early 
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success story. Fifteen new investment trust companies were formed in 1888 with a capital 
of ₤9,500,000 and another nineteen in the following year, with the capital of ₤25 million. 
The total capital invested in investment trust companies at the end of 1889 was 
approximately ₤50 million.41 As of the end of 1890, 119 investment trusts were listed in 
The Investor’s Monthly Manual, with total capital of ₤60,076,805. Of this amount, the 
trusts with names suggesting overseas investments had a total capital of ₤6,366,426, or 
10.6 percent.42 There were trusts with the titles such as Colonial Securities, Ltd., Foreign, 
American, and General Investment Trust, Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, Ltd., 
South African Gold Trust and Agency, Ltd., and United States and South American 
Investment Trust, Ltd. 
 British investors had access to securities from many foreign issuers. Henry 
Lowenfeld, and English author, in his 1909 book Investment, an Exact Science lists forty 
countries with stock markets open to British investors.43 These securities represented 
different regions of the world, as well as varied across industries. Investors had access to 
bonds, preferred stocks, and ordinary stocks. Investors were also able to invest overseas 
through an important group of intermediaries, investment trust companies. Overall, the 
ability to trade foreign securities in London was a crucial characteristic of the investment 
opportunity set in Britain. 
 
                                                 
41 Riple, 1934, pp. 123—124. 
42 The authors’ calculations using the data from The Investor’s Monthly Manual, 31 December 1890. Only 
the funds with distinctly sounding foreign titles were included in the calculation, and therefore the figure is 
biased downward. 
43 Great Britain, India, Canada, Australia, Tasmania, New Zealand, Straits Settlements (Singapore), 
Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Holland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Bulgaria, France, 
Greece, Italy, Hungary, Portugal, Roumania, Spain, Serbia, Turkey, Japan (Tokyo and Yokohama), China 
(Shanghai and Hong Kong), Cape Colony, Natal, Transvaal, Egypt, New York, Mexico, Argentine, Brazil, 
Chile, Peru and Uruguay. 
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The Information Environment 
 Successful development of a financial market requires access to information. If 
British investors were to place their capital at risk in remote parts of the world, it is only 
natural to expect that they would have had a strong demand for information about their 
investments. The emergence of London as the world financial center took place at a time 
of revolutionary improvement in information transmission. Britain was at the forefront of 
the technological change. Electric telegraph, based on scientific discoveries, 
technological innovations, and engineering talent, linked the City of London with most 
distant parts of the world.44  
 The first electric telegraph line established in Europe for the actual transmission 
of messages was between London and Birmingham, in 1838, by Sir Charles Wheatstone 
(1802—1875). In France the first line was constructed in 1844 between Paris and Rouen. 
The lines between Paris and Orleans, and Paris and Lille were constructed in the years 
1847 and 1848. The first line constructed in the United States was put in operation in 
June, 1844, between Washington and Baltimore. The next year it was continued to New 
York and Boston, and in 1846 to Buffalo and Harrisburg.45 
 First telegraph lines used overhead copper wires. As technology improved, it 
became possible to lay telegraph lines under water.  Prescott wrote in 1860: “The English 
                                                 
44 Kaukiainen argues that there was a substantial improvement in the speed of world-wide information 
transmission even before the introduction of the electric telegraph. He collects data from the Lloyd’s List 
and argues that between 1820 and 1860, transmission times dropped substantially, in many cases to a third 
or even a fifth and in no case to less than about a half. The median interval in days between dispatch and 
receipt between London and St. Petersburg went from 25 days in 1820 to 7 in 1860. For other routes these 
numbers are: London and Gibraltar, 21 and 8 days; London and Constantinople, 38 and 10 days; London 
and Bombay, 145 and 26 days; London and New York, 32 and 13 days. Kaukiainen, Yrjo, 2001, 
“Shrinking the world: Improvements in the speed of information transmission, c. 1820—1870,” European 
Review of Economic History 5, 1—28. 
45 Prescott, George B., 1866, History, Theory, and Practice of the Electric Telegraph, Boston: Ticknor and 
Fields. 
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were the first to lay submarine cables, and are now far in advance of the rest of the world 
in their manufacture, and in machinery for laying them.”46 By 1860, three lines were in 
existence between England and the Continent. Submarine cables connected England and 
Ireland, and Denmark and Sweden. Nearly one hundred submarine cables totaling more 
than 25,000 miles had been laid around the world, uniting about one-half million miles of 
land lines in America, Great Britain, Europe, India, Africa, Asia and Russia.47 The 
Atlantic cable, connecting Ireland with Newfoundland and New York, and thus 
permitting Europe to communicate telegraphically with America, was laid 1858 and the 
first public dispatch – that of the Queen to the President of the United States – was 
received on August 17. Communications broke down, however, in September. The first 
fully successful Atlantic cable was completed in 1866. 
 The speed of information transmission through the telegraph system also 
improved continuously. In the 1860’s, a telegraphic message could reach London from 
India in eight and a half hours.48 “The actual celerity with which correspondence is 
transmitted between London and parts of Europe more or less remote, may be judged 
from the fact that the Queen’s speech, delivered at the opening of the recent 
Parliamentary session, was delivered verbatim, and circulated in Paris and in Berlin, 
before her Majesty had left the House of Lords.”49 This was quite an improvement over 
the situation merely ten years before, when the fastest form of transport between London 
and Paris involved hours of travel, with the closing prices of the Paris Bourse not being 
                                                 
46 Prescott, 1866, p. 174. 
47 Shiers, George, 1977, The Electric Telegraph: An Historical Anthology, New York: Arno Press. 
48 Prescott, 1866, p. 478. 
49 Prescott, 1866, p. 217. Written in 1860. 
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received at the London Stock Exchange until 10 a.m. the following day.50 Kaukiainen 
compares overseas dispatch times to London before and after the introduction of 
telegraph. The dispatch time between London and Bombay decreased from 145 days by 
post in 1820 to 3 days in 1870 by telegraph. These numbers were: London and Hong 
Kong 141 days in 1840 and 3 days in 1870; London and Sydney, 140 days (1820) and 4 
days (1870). 
 The financial community quickly adopted the telegraph. By 1908, there were nine 
wires between the London and Paris stock exchanges. London was connected to all 
European financial centers, as well as more remote locations—New York (1866), 
Melbourne (1872), and Buenos Aires (1874). In 1871, the annual volume of telegrams 
between London and New York reached 42,000. Although the most rapid long-distance 
telegraph communications existed between the London Stock Exchange and New York, 
similar links were established throughout the world through a network of submarine and 
land lines.51 Even with the invention of the telephone, in 1876, the telegraph remained an 
important channel of communications.52 Telephone service was for a long time quite 
limited. And although the line between London and Paris operated since 1891, there was 
no transcontinental telephone until 1915. 
 These technological developments changed the informational environment of 
British investors. By 1870, with the development of the electric telegraph network, 
British investors could receive news concerning political events world-wide, economic 
                                                 
50 Michie, R.C., 1987, The London and New York stock exchanges, 1850—1914, London: Allen and Unwin. 
51 R. C. Michie, 1987, p. 47. 
52 Professor Bell and Colonel Raynolds demonstrated the possibilities of the telephone to Queen Victoria 
on 14th January, 1878. 
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and trade news, and even news regarding the weather and the storms affecting the crops 
in the colonies.  
 
Investment Theories and Diversification 
 British investors understood the benefits of international diversification. Perhaps 
they were not employing the formal statistical tools and did not analyze the correlations 
between various investments. They have clearly understood, however, that they could 
achieve better risk and return opportunities by investing part of their portfolio in foreign 
securities. The quantitative analysis of international diversification dates at least to Henry 
Lowenfeld’s (1909) study of equal-weighted, industry-neutral, international 
diversification strategies. In his book, he argues that superior investment performance can 
be obtained by spreading capital in equal proportion across a number of geographical 
areas and carefully re-balancing back to these proportions on a regular basis.53 This 
geographical diversification strategy was apparently a popular one with British and other 
European investors during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.54 
 To support the recommendation for international diversification, Lowenfeld 
postulates that different factors affect securities from different countries. The dominant 
factor affecting security returns is the market factor (Market Influence in his terminology) 
for that country. In support of this argument, Lowenfeld displays a chart showing the 
price movements of twelve British stocks (actually fixed income securities) from the year 
1893 to the end of 1906 to argue that there is a large degree of co-movement between 
                                                 
53 Lowenfeld, Henry, 1907, Investment and Exact Science, The Financial Review of Reviews, London.  
54 Goetzmann, William N., Andrey Ukhov, and Ning Zhu, 2001, China and the World Financial Markets 
1870-1930: Modern Lessons from Historical Globalization, Yale International Center for Finance Working 
Paper No. 00-62. 
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them. Then the author points out that even if an investor holds a mixed assortment of 
British stocks he cannot expect the movements in the value of the investments to 
counterbalance each other, because all of them are subject to the influence from the home 
market-wide risk factor. This logic is similar to modern international asset pricing 
theories that show that returns on an asset are a function of the asset’s exposure to the 
world market factor, and of the national market factor in the asset’s domestic market.  
 To show that this logic applies to financial markets in other countries, Lowenfeld 
provides charts of price movements of the stocks of the following countries: Great 
Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, Japan, USA, and Argentina 
(the figure is reproduced in Appendix A). He concludes that the value of all securities 
that come from the same country is influenced by that country’s market factor. At the 
same time he points out that  securities from different countries do not have the same 
degree of co-movement as securities within one country. This observation allows 
Lowenfeld to put forward an investment principle which he calls “The Geographical 
Distribution of Capital.” According to this principle, an investor spreads his wealth across 
securities from different countries, thereby diversifying away country-specific risks: 
 “If an investor divides his capital equally among a number of stocks, 
every one of which is under a different trade influence, then each of these 
divisions of his capital will constitute a distinct investment risk, and a true 
system of averaging investment risks is thereby established.”55 
 
 Lowenfeld also observes that when holding a diversified international portfolio an 
investor can achieve a higher level of return for the same level of risk compared to the 
case when only domestic securities are held in a portfolio: 
                                                 
55 Lowenfeld, 1907, p. 51. 
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“An investor who geographically distributes his capital can, with safety, 
afford to hold stocks which yield a larger income56 than he can hope to 
receive from an Investment List which disregards the important point of 
Geographical Distribution.”57 
 
 Lowenfeld’s book shows that British investors, including the managers of banks, 
insurance, and finance companies, as well as large private investors, had a sophisticated 
way of thinking about investments. In many ways the views expressed in the book 
correspond to the ideas of the Modern Portfolio Theory, which was formally developed 
more than fifty years laterg. He advocates, for example, analyzing investments from a 
portfolio point of view and explains “the necessity of considering all investments held as 
one harmonious whole, of which all the component parts must properly balance each 
other.”58 
 Lowenfeld also considers how an internationally diversified portfolio should be 
constructed for an investor who has limited wealth. He recommends that the first stock 
that an investor buys for his portfolio be of “a general international character.”59 In other 
words, the first stock should be a stock that represents a world market portfolio. The 
second stock should be a British stock. Consistent with the principle of diversification, 
the author recommends that the next sum should be invested “in a stock whose trade 
influence is most likely to be in diametrical contrast to that of Great Britain.”60 Once 
again, he expresses a view consistent with modern financial theory, namely with the 
formal statistical result that the lowest variance of a portfolio can be achieved when 
assets in the portfolio are negatively correlated.  
                                                 
56 That is, riskier stocks. 
57 Lowenfeld, 1907, pp. 53—54.  
58 Lowenfeld, 1907, pp. 72—73, emphasis as in the original text. 
59 Lowenfeld gives the following examples: Shipping Companies, Marine Insurance Companies, and Cable 
Companies.  
60 Lowenfeld, 1907, pp. 90. 
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 In his discussion of The Geographical Distribution of Capital Lowenfeld takes 
into account both returns from foreign assets, as well as the risks. But how well did 
British investors understand the risks of foreign investment? The short answer is, “Very 
well.” Investors in Britain had a sufficiently long history of active involvement in 
international financial market to accumulate negative experience and to learn the fact that 
placing capital in foreign lands can be risky. “By 1843, British citizens were believed to 
hold over ₤120 million of foreign bonds, including those of the American states, but at 
least ₤50 million were in default with dividends anything from five to twenty-five years 
overdue.”61 
 Investors understood the risks, and were familiar with the difficulties that arose 
when foreign securities were in default. In 1875 the Government appointed a Select 
Committee to investigate the circumstances surrounding many foreign loans and the 
reasons for default on such loans. Loans raised by Honduras, San Domingo, Costa Rica, 
and Paraguay with the total nominal value of ₤10 million were subject of the inquiry. The 
Committee uncovered unsound lending practices on part of the syndicates that were 
formed to take portions of the loan at a price considerably below the issue price and re-
sell the loan to the public. Honduras incurred a debt of ₤5,990,000 in the nominal 
principal value, and in return for the liability provided security in the form of an 
abandoned section of a railway line 53 miles in length for which the builder received 
₤689,000. The Committee remarked of San Domingo that “it is clear that the Republic 
felt the improvidence of a bargain by which in return for a sum of ₤320,000 it was to 
repay in respect of interest and sinking fund annuities amounting to a total sum of 
₤1,472,500, or in other words, more than 18 per cent per annum for twenty five years.” 
                                                 
61 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, pp. 86—87. Their work contains an extensive discussion on early defaults. 
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Overall, at the end of 1878, 54% of Britain’s loans to foreign governments were in total 
or partial default.62 
 Another period of crisis, this time resulting from heavy borrowing by Argentina, 
were the years 1888 through 1893, and again in 1896. Argentina carried a heavy burden 
of external debt, the amount at the beginning of 1890 was approximately ₤22 million, 
experienced high inflation, and generally was in poor financial condition. In 1890 it 
became evident that the Argentine Government could not meet its obligations and 
guarantees on external railway and other loans and prices of Argentine securities fell 
dramatically in London.63 The price of the Argentine Government Bond of 1886 fell by 
17.5% from the end of 1889 to the end of 1890. The Buenos Ayres 1882 bond fell by 
31.5% during the same period.64 A series of renegotiations between a committee of 
English creditors chaired by Lord Rothschild and the Argentine Government took place 
in 1893 and 1896, and some of the losses of the bondholders were recovered. 
 The risks of foreign investments must be considered jointly with returns. And in 
many cases investments in foreign government loans gave a very reasonable rate of 
return. Writing in 1881, Nash lists approximately 130 foreign government securities with 
a total market capitalization of over ₤1,400 million, about half of which were believed to 
be in British ownership. For stocks that had been issued that long, he traces the dividend 
history back to 1870, finds remarkably few defaults, and reports an average dividend 
yield of 5.87%.65 By 1870’s, British investors understood the risks of foreign 
                                                 
62 Ripley, 1934, pp. 102—103. 
63 Ripley, 1934, pp. 152—153. 
64 End-of-the-year prices are from The Investor’s Monthly Manual, December 31, 1890, p. 620. 
65 Morgan and Thomas, 1962, p. 91. 
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investments. They also understood the benefits that come from international 
diversification, and paid attention to both risk and return when placing capital abroad. 
 
Benefits of Overseas Investment:  
Evidence from the Modern Portfolio Theory 
Theory 
 Let there be N risky assets available to the investors. The investment opportunity 
set is described by the vector of expected returns on the N  assets, z , and by Σ , the 
covariance matrix. Modern portfolio theory assumes that the investors’ preferences can 
be represented by a utility function defined over mean (the expected return) and variance 
of a portfolio’s return. The assumption is that investors favor higher means and smaller 
variances. Minimum-variance portfolios are portfolios that have the smallest variance for 
every level of expected returns. In the absence of a risk-less asset the minimum variance 
portfolio with expected return µ is the solution ( )µw  to 
.                 
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Vector w is the vector of weights of risky securities in the portfolio. When no positivity 
constraints of the form 0≥iw  are imposed, unrestricted short sales are permitted. With 
no short sale restrictions and no risk-free asset available, in mean-standard deviation 
space, with mean return on the y-axis and standard deviation on the x-axis, the set of 
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minimum variance portfolios is a hyperbola, as illustrated in Figure 1.66 When a risk-less 
asset is available a Capital Allocation Line (CAL) obtains. It is a straight line which 
intersects the y-axis at the risk-free rate and is tangent to the minimum variance frontier 
constructed from risky assets. The Capital Asset Pricing Model identifies the tangency 
point as the market portfolio. Sharpe ratio, which equals the slope of the CAL, 
characterizes the risk-return trade-off of the market portfolio and is computed as 
,
p
fp
p
rr
S σ
−=  
where pr  is the expected return on the market portfolio, r is the risk-free interest rate, 
and pσ  is the standard deviation of the return on the market portfolio. Portfolios with 
higher Sharpe ratios offer more attractive risk-return trade-off. 
 Investors frequently face short-sales constraints. The minimum variance frontier 
can still be constructed. When no risk-free asset is available, the optimization problem (1) 
is modified by adding short sales constraints 0≥iw  for all assets, Ni ,,1K= . In this case 
there is no simple analytical characterization of the frontier, and numerical optimization 
methods are required to compute the frontier portfolios. Generally, with positivity 
constraints the frontier is not a hyperbola.67 If a risk-free asset is available, it is still 
possible to draw a straight line with the intercept equal to the risk-free rate tangent to the 
minimum variance frontier. The tangency point is the market portfolio in this case, and its 
Sharpe ratio (the slope of the line) characterizes the risk-return trade-off that the investors 
in the economy face.  
                                                 
66 Markowitz, Harry, 1952, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance 7, pp. 77—91. Merton, Robert C., 
1972, “An Analytical Derivation of the Efficient Portfolio Frontier,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 7, pp. 1851—72. 
67 Dybvig, Philip H., 1984, “Short Sales Restrictions and Kinks of the Mean Variance Frontier,” Journal of 
Finance 39, pp. 239—44. 
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 To evaluate the role of the foreign assets we first construct minimum variance 
portfolios with only domestic assets. We then include foreign assets in the investment 
opportunity set and construct minimum variance portfolios again. We follow this 
procedure to quantify the improvement in the risk-return trade-off due to the inclusion of 
foreign investments. 
 
Evidence from Five Broadly Defined Asset Classes 
  We begin our minimum-variance analysis by using five broadly defined asset 
classes: UK Equity, UK Preferred, UK Debt, Foreign Equity, and Foreign Debt. The asset 
classes are defined by Edelstein. Table 6 displays expected annual returns on the five 
asset classes, standard deviations, and correlations. Foreign equity has a higher return 
than domestic equity, 8.66% compared to 6.61%. Foreign debt has a higher return than 
domestic debt, 4.94% and 3.35%, respectively. At the same time, with a standard 
deviation of 9.36% foreign equity is riskier than domestic equity, which has a standard 
deviation of 7.38%. Foreign debt does not appear to be riskier than domestic debt. 
Foreign debt returns have a standard deviation of 2.37% compared to 2.36% for domestic 
debt. This, however, can be attributed to the fact that foreign debt asset class includes a 
much greater number of securities than the domestic debt asset class. By including a large 
number of government and industrial bonds from around the globe, foreign debt already 
takes advantage of diversification opportunities. Examination of the correlation matrix 
reveals a high correlation between domestic common and preferred shares (0.71). The 
correlation between domestic and foreign equity returns is lower at 0.39. 
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 Data from Table 6 is used to construct a mean-variance frontier with only British 
asset classes and a frontier that uses all five asset classes. The two frontiers are shown in 
Figure 1. No short sale restrictions are imposed. We refer to this case as “unconstrained.” 
The figure illustrates a substantial improvement in the risk-return trade-off resulting from 
the inclusion of the foreign asset classes. The hyperbola constructed with foreign assets is 
located higher and to the left compared to the hyperbola that utilizes domestic assets 
only, indicating that any level of expected return µ can be attained with less risk σ when 
foreign assets are used. Figure 2 is similar to Figure 1, except that no short sales are 
allowed—investments in all assets are constrained to be positive. Inclusion of foreign 
assets clearly improves risk-return characteristics of the frontier. The market (tangency) 
portfolio constructed with only UK assets has expected return of 5.21%, standard 
deviation of 3.89%, and a Sharpe ratio of 0.67. When foreign asset classes are included, 
the market portfolio has expected return of 5.02%, substantially less risk (2.40%), and a 
Sharpe ratio of 1.01. 
 Table 7 shows portfolio characteristics of the market portfolios created with 
different mixes of assets. Both the unconstrained and constrained cases are shown. 
Without short-sale constraints UK market portfolio has expected return of 7.51%, 
standard deviation of 6.99%, and Sharpe ratio of 0.70. When foreign stocks and bonds are 
included Sharpe ratio increases to 1.18. The market portfolio has expected return of 
7.02% and substantially less risk (3.73%). The analysis suggests that given the risk and 
return characteristics of the five asset classes, rational investors maximizing expected 
return for a given level of risk should take advantage of the diversification opportunities 
and include foreign asset classes in their portfolios.  
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To highlight the role of diversification, we perform the following experiment. We 
maintain the correlation matrix and the standard deviations of all asset classes, but set 
expected return on each foreign asset class equal to that of the corresponding UK asset 
class. Since returns on UK asset classes are lower, this effectively penalizes investment 
abroad. Expected return on foreign equity is now set to 6.61%, down from 8.66%. All the 
benefits from investing abroad are now caused by diversification benefits, not by higher 
returns offered by foreign assets. The results are presented in Table 8. Without short-sale 
constraints, the market portfolio with penalized foreign assets has Sharpe ratio of 0.75, 
below the un-penalized value of 1.18, but still higher than the UK-only domestic 
portfolio with Sharpe ratio of 0.70. The results are stronger when short-sales are not 
allowed. In this case, the penalized market portfolio that includes foreign assets achieves 
a higher expected return than the UK-only portfolio (5.32% vs. 5.21%), and has a lower 
risk (3.86% vs. 3.89%). Foreign equity is riskier than domestic equity. Foreign debt is 
riskier than domestic debt. The returns on foreign and the corresponding domestic assets 
are set to be the same. Yet, it is still optimal to include foreign assets in the portfolio and 
take advantage of the diversification opportunities that investing overseas offers. The 
analysis also gives a benchmark level of investment abroad. Under the realistic 
assumption of no short sales and with foreign assets being penalized by setting their 
expected returns to the lower values of UK expected returns, the market portfolio still has 
14% of wealth invested in foreign equity. 
The benefit of equalizing the mean returns of domestic and foreign asset classes is 
that our analysis is robust to a range of assumptions about risk aversion.  There is no 
implicit trade-off off between mean and variance in a situation in which the expected 
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returns are equal.  The diversification result is thus driven solely by differences in 
variance and covariance between domestic and international asset classes. 
  
Analysis of UK and Foreign Equity 
 The analysis can be refined in several ways. First, the number of asset classes can 
be increased. Instead of simply analyzing UK equity securities as one asset class, it is 
possible to include different industries in the study. We consider UK equity securities 
from 11 industries. We assume throughout this section that UK investors limited the 
number of assets in their portfolios. When investors face fixed transaction costs, such as 
brokerage commissions, and have limited funds available, they take transaction costs into 
account while forming portfolios. This results in investors not using all assets in the 
opportunity set, but only investing in a sub-set of assets. We assume that investors used 
seven assets in their portfolios. There are 330 different subsets of seven UK equity 
securities assets drawn from eleven. The three sub-sets that result in a market portfolio 
with the highest Sharpe ratios are listed in Table 9. In the constrained case the best 
combination of seven assets produces market portfolio with Sharpe ratio of 1.055, in the 
un-constrained case this number is 1.372.  
Now include four world equity classes in the investment opportunity set. There 
are 6,435 different subsets of seven assets drawn from 15 equity asset classes. The three 
sub-sets that produce market portfolios with the highest Sharpe ratio are given in Table 
10. Including foreign equity improves the best possible case. For the constrained case, 
Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio is now 1.149 and 1.50 for the un-constrained case. 
When foreign equity is included in the opportunity set the expected return on the market 
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portfolio increases when compared to the UK-only case from 8.79% to 9.28% 
(constrained case), and from 12.4% to 13.5% (unconstrained case). Figure 3 shows the 
mean-variance frontier constructed with seven best UK-only equity asset classes and with 
seven best selected from 15 UK and world equity indices. The figure illustrates the 
improvement in the risk-return trade-off that results from the inclusion of the overseas 
investments.68  It is important to point out that the positivity constraints used in this 
analysis are consistent with real limitations to shorting sector indices and individual 
securities on the London market.  Although short-selling was certainly practiced through 
much of this period, it is unlikely that it would have been used by a long-term investor to 
maintain an optimal position in tern of risk and return of the portfolio. 
 
Equity and Debt 
 We repeat the previous analysis but now include UK and foreign debt. The 
investment opportunity set now includes 19 asset classes: 5 UK Equity indices; 2 UK 
Preferred Share indices, 4 UK Debt indices, and 8 foreign asset classes (4 equity and 4 
debt). Again, we assume that portfolios contain seven assets. There are 50,388 different 
subsets of seven asset classes drawn from nineteen. The sub-sets that produce market 
portfolios with the highest Sharpe ratio are given in Table 11. When short-sale 
constraints are imposed (Panel A) the best portfolio invests in three foreign asset classes 
and produces a Sharpe ratio of 1.278. This may be compared to the best sub-set of 7 
                                                 
68 The results hold not only for the very best group of 7 assets. In the un-constrained case when groups of 7 
assets are ranked by the Sharpe ratio of their market portfolio, all top 200 groups contain at least one 
foreign equity asset class. The average optimal investment overseas across these 200 groups is 68%. In the 
case of short-sale constraints, when groups of 7 assets are ranked by the Sharpe ratio of their market 
portfolio, all top 1,000 groups contain at least one foreign asset class. The average optimal overseas 
allocation across these 1,000 groups equals 47%. 
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assets drawn form 11 UK-only asset classes that produces market portfolio with expected 
return of 7.84%, standard deviation of 4.77%, and a lower Sharpe ratio of 1.099 (not 
shown in the table).69 Examination of recommended portfolio weights shows that the 
constrained optimization procedure suggests that in the best cases, 48 to 52 percent of 
wealth should be invested in world railway debt securities. This finding is particularly 
remarkable in light of the fact that between 1865 and 1941, at least 41 percent of total 
new overseas issues raised on British exchanges went solely for railway plant and 
equipment.70 
 In the unconstrained case the best subset of 7 assets from 11 UK-only asset 
classes produces market portfolio with Sharpe ratio of 1.46. When overseas asset classes 
are available, the best subset of 7 from 19 includes 4 foreign asset classes and produces 
market portfolio with a significantly higher Sharpe ratio of 1.95. Figure 4 shows mean-
variance frontiers and capital allocation lines constructed with the best sub-sets of seven 
asset classes. When foreign assets are included in the opportunity set the Capital 
Allocation Line has a higher slope, indicating that a higher expected return can be 
obtained for the same level of risk. 
 We now take our analysis one step further. For the 19 UK and overseas asset 
classes we once again maintain the correlations and the standard deviations of all assets, 
but set expected return on each foreign asset class equal to that of the corresponding UK 
asset class. As before, this effectively penalizes investment abroad and highlights the role 
of diversification. The results are presented in Table 12. In the constrained case (Panel 
                                                 
69 Benefits from using foreign asset classes are seen not only in the best 3 sub-sets, but also in the best one 
thousand. In the case of short-sale constraints when groups of 7 assets are ranked by Sharpe ratio of their 
market portfolio, all top 1,000 groups contain at least one foreign asset class. They all beat the UK-only 
best case. 
70 Edelstein, 1982, p. 37. 
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A) the best market portfolio has a Sharpe ratio of 1.15, compared to the best UK-only 
market portfolio with Sharpe ratio of 1.099. The market portfolio that uses penalized 
overseas indices has both higher return (7.99% vs. 7.84%) and lower risk (4.69% vs. 
4.77%) than the UK-only portfolio. Three out of seven asset classes in the top performing 
portfolios are foreign assets and the total fraction of wealth invested overseas is just 
above 20%. Similar results are obtained when short sales are allowed. The Sharpe ratio of 
the penalized foreign portfolio equals 1.700, higher than the Sharpe ratio of the UK-only 
portfolio of 1.46. Even when foreign assets are penalized with lower expected returns, 
they provide substantial improvement to the risk-return trade-off and should be included 
in the optimal portfolio. 
 
Conclusion 
 Our findings indicate that diversification played an important role in the decision 
of British investors to allocate a significant fraction of their portfolio to overseas 
securities. Even when — by setting expected return on each foreign asset class equal to 
that of the corresponding UK asset class — we put foreign assets at a disadvantage, we 
find that it was rational for an investor to include a large proportion of foreign debt and 
equity in the portfolio. British investors had access to securities from all over the world. 
They also had access to news concerning political and economic events world-wide. 
Investors understood the notion of diversification, albeit in a slightly  less formally 
developed at the time, and followed this principle by allocating a significant portion of 
their investments abroad. Our analysis shows that this behavior was consistent with the 
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recommendations obtained by applying Modern Portfolio Theory to the return series of 
securities available to the UK investors.  
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Table 1 
Nominal value of Securities Quoted on the London Stock Exchange in 1843 
 
No. Type ₤ 
 British and Irish Funded Debt 773,000,000 
 Loans to Foreign Governments (including the United States) 121,500,000 
        Total Government Bonds 894,500,000 
   
70 Railway Companies 57,448,000 
 Banking and Interest Companies 46,450,000 
59 Canal Companies 17,862,000 
8 Dock Companies 12,177,000 
 Turnpike Trusts 8,775,000 
 East India Company 6,000,000 
 South Sea Company 3,663,000 
24  Foreign Mining Companies 6,465,000 
81 British Mining Companies 4,500,000 
107 Assurance Companies 26,000,000 
27 Gas, Light and Coke Companies 4,327,000 
11 Water Companies 2,536,000 
5 Bridge Companies 2,124,000 
4 Literary Institutions 1,003,000 
196 Shipping, Land, Asphalt, Loan, etc. Companies 25,000,000 
  224,330,000 
   
 
Source: Percy Ripley (1934), p. 80, who does not provide the source for his figures. This table matches a 
table in Jenks (1927), p. 373, who gives W.F. Spackman (1843) as a source. 
 
 
Table 2 
Par Value of Overseas Securities Quoted on the London Stock Exchange in January, 1893 
Type ₤ 
Colonial Government Securities 225,000,000 
Foreign Government Securities 525,000,000 
Colonial and Foreign Corporation Stocks 20,000,000 
Railways in British Possessions 75,000,000 
Railways in India 65,000,000 
Railways in United States 120,500,000 
Railways in Other Foreign Countries 127,500,000 
Banks operating abroad 50,000,000 
Foreign Breweries 3,500,000 
Gas Companies operating abroad 6,500,000 
Iron Companies operating abroad  500,000 
Land and Mortgage Companies 100,000,000 
Tea Companies 2,500,000 
Telegraph Companies 10,000,000 
Waterworks Companies operating abroad 3,000,000 
Tramway Companies operating abroad 4,000,000 
Miscellaneous Companies—Colonial and Foreign 30,000,000 
  
 1,368,000,000 
  
 
Source: Ripley (1934), p. 154, who does not provide the source for his figures. 
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Table 3 
Capital Publicly Invested by Great Britain Overseas 
December 1913 
 
Geographical Distribution Asset Classes and Industries 
Description  ₤, in ‘000 Description ₤, in ‘000 
Canada and Newfoundland 514,870 Colonial Governments 675,464 
Australia 332,112 Foreign Governments 284,059 
New Zealand 84,334 Total Government Loans 959,523 
Africa—South  370,192   
Africa—West  37,305 Municipal 147,547 
India and Ceylon 378,776   
Straits Settlements 27,293 Colonial Railways 306,460 
Hong Kong 3,104 Indian Railways 140,796 
British North Borneo 5,820 American Railways 616,581 
Other Asiatic Colonies 26,189 Foreign Railways 457,177 
Total India and Colonies 1,779,995 Total Railways 1,521,014 
    
United States 754,617 Banks 72,909 
Cuba 33,075 Breweries 17,980 
Philippines 8,217 Canals and Docks 7,111 
Argentina 319,565 Commercial and Industrial 145,332 
Brazil 147,967 Electric Lighting and Power 27,310 
Mexico 99,019 Financial, Land and Investment 244,187 
Chili  61,143 Gas and Water 29,216 
Uruguay 36,124 Insurance 246 
Peru 34,173 Iron, Coal, and Steel 30,535 
Miscellaneous American 25,538 Mines 272,789 
Russia 66,627 Motor Traction, etc. 1,059 
Egypt 44,912 Nitrate 11,623 
Spain  19,057 Oil 40,579 
Turkey 18,696 Rubber 40,982 
Italy 12,440 Shipping 794 
Portugal 8,136 Tea and Coffee 22,443 
France 8,020 Telegraphs and Telephones 43,692 
Germany 6,364 Tramways 77,790 
Miscellaneous European 54,580   
Japan 62,816   
China 43,883   
Miscellaneous Foreign other than    
   European or American 69,697   
Total Foreign 1,934,666 Total Industrial, etc. 1,086,577 
    
Grand Total 3,714,661 Grand Total 3,714,661 
    
 
Source: Ripley, 1934, p. 175. Ripley states that the figures were computed by Sir George Paish. 
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Table 4 
London Stock Exchange: Government Securities (British, Colonial and Foreign Stocks) 
 
       
       
 1869 1890   1869 1890 
American    Hungarian - 3 
   United States 7 2  Indian 12 4 
   Virginia 2 3  Italian 4 3 
   Massachusetts 1 5  Jamaica - 3 
Antigua  1 -  Japanese - 1 
Argentine 4 24  Mauritius 4 4 
Austrian 3 3  Mexican 3 2 
Australian 12 26  Montevidean 1 - 
Belgian  2 1  Moorish 1 - 
Brazilian 5 8  New Granada 4 - 
British 16 12  Natal 2 5 
British Colombian 4 -  New Brunswick 1 - 
British Guiana - 1  New Zealand 7 10 
Canadian 7 22  Nicaragua - 1 
Cape of Good Hope 6 10  Norwegian - 3 
Ceylon 3 3  Nova Scotia 2 - 
Chilean 5 4  Orange F. State - 1 
Chinese - 4  Paraguay - 2 
Columbian 1 1  Peruvian  2 2 
Costa Rica - 2  Portuguese 2 1 
Cuba 5 -  Prussian - 1 
Danish 7 2  Queensland 2 5 
Danubian Principalities 2 1  Russian 10 17 
Dutch 4 2  San Domingo - 1 
Ecuador 2 1  Sardinian 1 1 
Egyptian 9 5  Spanish 4 3 
Fijian - 1  Straits Settlements - 1 
French 2 3  Swedish 3 3 
Greek 2 5  Trinidad - 2 
Guatemala 1 1  Tasmanian 2 4 
Hawaii - 1  Turkish 10 9 
Honduras 1 2  Uruguay - 2 
    Venezuela 5 1 
       
       
       
       
 
The table shows the number of different issues for each government. The figures for 1869 are from The 
Investor’s Monthly Manual published on January 30, 1869. The figures for 1890 are from The Investor’s 
Monthly Manual published on January 31, 1890.  
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Table 5 
Nominal Value of Securities Quoted on the Stock Exchange (₤ million) 
 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Jan. 1 Dec. 28 Dec. 31 Dec. 13 Dec. 31 
 1853 1863 1873 1883 1893 1903 1913 1920 
British Funds, etc.         
   British Government         
   Guaranteed & Nationalisation Stocks 853.6 901.9 858.9 871.6 810.2 936.2 1,013.0 5,418.2 
Corporation, County Stocks, Public         
   Boards, etc. Gt. Britain & N. Ireland - - - 50.0 91.4 166.0 277.1 335.0 
Corporation Stocks, Indian, Colonial         
   And Foreign - - 35.3 13.0 43.9 48.1 156.5 159.5 
Dominion Provincial & Colonial,         
   Government Securities - 24.7 47.3 130.6 264.9 334.6 455.7 540.5 
Foreign Stocks, Bonds, etc. 69.7 146.7 403.9 831.5 2,384.6 2,884.3 3,133.9 2,394.2 
Railways:-         
   Gt. Britain & Northern Ireland 193.7 245.2 374.0 658.1 854.8 1,104.6 1,217.3 1,259.5 
   Indian (and Native Loan) 80.0 105.5 134.0 151.4 159.9 
   Dominion & Colonial 
Inc. in 
Foreign 68.7 102.0 51.6 119.0 154.5 313.4 323.3 
   American - - 82.7 307.6 743.7 1,107.5 1,729.6 2,534.7 
   Foreign 31.3 132.0 168.6 378.0 596.1 581.9 736.1 870.9 
Banks and Discount Companies 6.5 17.7 103.7 55.8 62.6 200.2 294.4 392.0 
Breweries and Distilleries - - - - 52.1 118.4 103.8 120.8 
Canals and Docks 16.6 15.3 9.8 33.2 41.7 41.4 19.9 14.8 
Commercial, Industrial, etc. 21.9 26.7 19.7 18.9 93.3 256.5 438.6 669.2 
Electric Lighting & Power - - - - 75.3 105.8 
Gas 5.7 7.3 12.8 21.8 34.9 70.2 74.2 70.6 
Financial Trust, Land, Investment & Property - - 7.3 33.5 124.6 176.5 248.7 255.8 
Insurance 6.6 8.5 2.2 12.8 12.4 63.8 66.4 67.2 
Investment & Unit Trusts - - - - - - - - 
Iron, Coal, Steel & Copper - - 5.8 13.4 15.4 287.2 329.8 413.1 
Mines 7.4 5.2 7.6 20.8 32.9 41.1 60.2 11.4 
Nitrate - - - - - - 7.6 6.5 
Oil - - - - - - 23.6 79.6 
Rubber - - - - - - 
Tea and Coffee - - 1.1 1.6 1.6 9.7 24.9 32.3 
Shipping - - 7.1 10.8 11.8 28.7 45.3 66.8 
Telegraphs & Telephones - - 12.2 29.6 34.9 41.8 141.1 146.0 
Tramways and Omnibus - - 1.7 6.4 11.9 24.4 117.5 119.7 
Waterworks 2.1 4.5 6.1 10.8 16.9 22.2 7.2 8.8 
         
TOTAL 1,215.1 1,604.4 2,270.0 3,641.4 6,561.1 8,833.8 11,262.5 16,576.1 
 
Source: Morgan and Thomas, 1962, pp. 282—283. They cite Burdett’s Official Intelligence, Stock Exchange Official Intelligence, and Stock Exchange Official 
Year Book.
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Table 6 
Mean, Standard Deviation, and Correlations 
  UKEQ UKPREF UKDEB FOREQ FORDEB 
UKEQ 1.0000     
UKPREF 0.7136 1.0000    
UKDEB 0.5764 0.6859 1.0000   
FOREQ 0.3938 0.3115 0.3064 1.0000  
FORDEB 0.5086 0.5462 0.6622 0.6145 1.0000 
Standard Deviation (%) 7.3780 3.6847 2.3653 9.3567 2.3732 
Mean (%) 6.6082 5.0102 3.3464 8.6632 4.9445 
 
The table shows average returns, standard deviation of returns, and correlations for five asset classes: UK 
Equity (UKEQ), UK Preferred (UKPREF), UK Debt (UKDEB), Foreign Equity (FOREQ), and Foreign 
Debt (FORDEB). The data corresponds to Edelstein, 1982, Table 5.5, p. 126. 
 
 
Table 7 
Optimal Portfolio Characteristics 
    Market Portfolio Weights 
  Market 
Expected 
Return (%) 
Market  
St. Dev. 
(%) 
 
Sharpe 
Ratio UKEQ UKPREF UKDEB FOREQ FORDEB 
UK Assets Only       
Unconstrained 7.51 6.99 0.70 0.285 1.945 -1.230   
Constrained 5.21 3.89 0.67 0.126 0.874 0.000   
         
UK Assets & Foreign Equity       
Unconstrained 9.37 7.95 0.85 0.046 1.830 -1.408 0.532  
Constrained 6.03 4.22 0.81 0.000 0.721 0.000 0.279  
         
UK Assets & Foreign Debentures      
Unconstrained 7.11 3.82 1.183 0.0058 0.533 -1.330  1.790 
Constrained 4.95 2.33 1.009 0.000 0.105 0.000  0.895 
         
All Five Asset Classes       
Unconstrained 7.02 3.73 1.184 0.013 0.517 -1.323 -0.025 1.817 
Constrained 5.02 2.40 1.011 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.019 0.872 
         
 
 
 
 44
 
Table 8 
Optimal Portfolio Characteristics 
When Expected Returns are set to be Equal 
 
    Market Portfolio Weights 
  Market 
Expected 
Return (%) 
Market  
St. Dev. 
(%) 
 
Sharpe 
Ratio UKEQ UKPREF UKDEB FOREQ FORDEB 
UK Assets Only       
Unconstrained 7.51 6.99 0.70 0.285 1.945 -1.230   
Constrained 5.21 3.89 0.67 0.126 0.874 0.000   
         
UK Assets & Foreign Equity       
Unconstrained 7.90 7.15 0.74 0.163 1.886 -1.321 0.272  
Constrained 5.32 3.86 0.71 0.056 0.803 0.000 0.141  
         
UK Assets & Foreign Debentures      
Unconstrained 7.31 6.70 0.70 0.268 1.856 -1.237  0.114 
Constrained 5.21 3.89 0.67 0.125 0.875 0.000  0.000 
         
All Five Asset Classes       
Unconstrained 10.79 10.87 0.75 0.246 2.894 -1.342 0.560 -1.358 
Constrained 5.32 3.86 0.71 0.056 0.803 0.000 0.141 0.000 
         
 
The rate of return on foreign equity is set equal to the rate of return on UK equity, and the rates of return 
on UK and Foreign debt are set equal to each other. 
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Table 9 
UK Equity: Selecting 7 out of 11 Asset Classes 
Panel A: Constrained Optimization 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 328 # 329 # 330 
Market: Sharpe   1.055 1.053 1.053 0.739 0.730 0.696 
Market: Mean, %   8.79 8.75 8.75 7.37 7.98 7.90 
Market: St.Dev, %   5.87 5.84 5.84 6.45 7.37 7.61 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
Asset 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
 
# 328 
 
# 329 
 
# 330 
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77    0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.400 0.404 0.404    
3 UKTXTL 7.69 9.32 0.194 0.208 0.208 0.350  0.477 
4 UKFD 13.73 15.77 0.129 0.124 0.124    
5 UKIRN 9.68 17.74 0.020   0.106 0.226 0.098 
6 UKIND 9.50 9.99 0.149 0.162 0.162    
7 UKUTIL 6.51 9.52  0.000  0.188 0.196 0.317 
8 UKCD 2.69 7.81   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 
9 UKSHIP 5.75 11.81    0.006 0.000 0.005 
10 UKTT 6.83 9.03 0.069 0.064 0.064 0.350 0.463  
11 UKTO 11.77 27.83 0.039 0.038 0.038  0.114 0.101 
 
Panel B: No Short-Sale Constraints 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 328 # 329 # 330 
Market: Sharpe   1.372 1.370 1.351 0.849 0.813 0.794 
Market: Mean, %   12.38 13.60 12.94 10.27 8.73 12.79 
Market: St.Dev, %   7.13 8.03 7.65 9.03 7.54 12.84 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
Asset 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
 
# 328 
 
# 329 
 
# 330 
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77 -0.786 -0.675 -0.718 -0.018 -0.255 0.066 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.856 0.869 0.945    
3 UKTXTL 7.69 9.32 0.415 0.439 0.460 0.543 0.384 0.787 
4 UKFD 13.73 15.77 0.165 0.179 0.215    
5 UKIRN 9.68 17.74    0.067 0.183 0.149 
6 UKIND 9.50 9.99 0.536 0.470 0.478    
7 UKUTIL 6.51 9.52 -0.244  -0.207 0.479 0.221 0.814 
8 UKCD 2.69 7.81  -0.359 -0.172 -0.717  -1.011 
9 UKSHIP 5.75 11.81    0.065 -0.061 -0.019 
10 UKTT 6.83 9.03    0.581 0.426  
11 UKTO 11.77 27.83 0.057 0.078   0.101 0.214 
          
 
Asset Classes: (1) UKRAIL – UK. Railways; (2) UKFIN – UK Finance: Banks and Insurance; (3) UKTXTL – UK 
Textiles; (4) UKFD – UK Food and Drink; (5) UKIRN – UK Iron, Steel, Coal and Heavy Industry; (6) UKIND – 
UK Industrial, including Mechanical Equipment, Electrical Equipment, Building and Construction Materials, and 
Chemicals; (7) UKUTIL – UK Utilities; (8) UKCD – UK Canals and Docks; (9) UKSHIP – UK Shipping; (10) 
UKTT – UK Telegraph and Telephone; (11) UKTO – UK Tramway and Omnibuses. 
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Table 10 
UK Equity (11) and World-Wide Equity (4): Selecting 7 out of 15 Asset Classes 
 
Panel A: Constrained Optimization 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 #6433 #6434 #6435 
Market: Sharpe   1.149 1.147 1.147 0.679 0.678 0.669 
Market: Mean, %   9.28 9.35 9.35 7.50 8.70 9.13 
Market: St.Dev, %   5.81 5.88 5.88 7.21 9.00 9.76 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
Asset 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
# 1 # 2 # 3 #6433 #6434 #6435 
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77    0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.140 0.160 0.160    
3 UKTXTL 7.69 9.32 0.222 0.229 0.229 0.341  0.503 
4 UKFD 13.73 15.77 0.144 0.149 0.149    
5 UKIRN 9.68 17.74  0.000  0.059 0.246 0.209 
6 UKIND 9.50 9.99 0.050 0.049 0.049    
7 UKUTIL 6.51 9.52   0.000 0.292 0.403  
8 UKCD 2.69 7.81    0.009 0.000 0.000 
9 UKSHIP 5.75 11.81    0.168 0.035 0.000 
10 UKTT 6.83 9.03 0.039      
11 UKTO 11.77 27.83 0.028 0.028 0.028  0.079 0.130 
          
Foreign Equity         
12 WRAIL 6.85 7.46       
13 WBANK 9.21 8.12 0.377 0.385 0.385    
14 WINFR 8.32 8.32       
15 WTEA 8.28 18.45    0.130 0.236 0.158 
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Table 10 (Continued) 
UK Equity (11) and World-Wide Equity (4): Selecting 7 out of 15 Asset Classes  
 
Panel B: No Short-Sale Constraints 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 #6433 #6434 #6435 
Market: Sharpe   1.50 1.50 1.50 0.761 0.742 0.699 
Market: Mean, %   13.49 13.77 12.88 9.80 14.21 13.65 
Market: St.Dev, %   7.24 7.43 6.85 9.47 15.65 15.82 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
Asset 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
# 1 # 2 # 3 #6433 #6434 #6435 
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77 -0.912 -0.738 -0.811 -0.506 -0.222 0.183 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.377 0.419 0.456    
3 UKTXTL 7.69 9.32 0.492 0.473 0.449 0.435  0.928 
4 UKFD 13.73 15.77 0.179 0.213 0.195    
5 UKIRN 9.68 17.74    0.190 0.431 0.350 
6 UKIND 9.50 9.99 0.401 0.298 0.368    
7 UKUTIL 6.51 9.52   -0.171 0.531 1.041  
8 UKCD 2.69 7.81  -0.246   -0.815 -0.733 
9 UKSHIP 5.75 11.81    0.067 -0.031 -0.201 
10 UKTT 6.83 9.03       
11 UKTO 11.77 27.83    0.073 0.221 0.297 
          
Foreign Equity         
12 WRAIL 6.85 7.46 -0.259      
13 WBANK 9.21 8.12 0.721 0.580 0.513    
14 WINFR 8.32 8.32       
15 WTEA 8.28 18.45    0.211 0.376 0.176 
          
 
Asset Classes: (12) WRAIL – World Rail Equity; (13) WBANK – World Banking Equity; (14) WINFR – 
World Infrastructure Equity; (15) WTEA – World Tea and Coffee Equity. 
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Table 11 
Debt and Equity: Selecting 7 out of 19 Asset Classes 
 
Panel A: Constrained Optimization 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 3 # 2 # 1 
Market: Sharpe   1.278 1.277 1.276 0.612 0.597 0.588 
Market: Mean, %   6.52 6.49 6.34 4.88 5.32 3.96 
Market: St.Dev, %   3.07 3.04 2.94 3.73 4.56 2.31 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
 
# 3 
 
# 2 
 
# 1 
UK Equity         
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77    0.000 0.000 0.000 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.062 0.076     
3 UKLIND 10.64 8.84 0.174 0.174 0.157    
4 UKHVIND 9.56 9.95       
5 UKINFRA 6.74 8.07    0.266   
UK Preferred         
6 UKRAILP 4.56 3.96    0.432 0.745 0.237 
7 UKINDP 5.70 4.75 0.054  0.079    
UK Debt         
8 UKMUNIDB 3.71 2.37    0.301 0.083 0.303 
9 UKRAILDB 3.79 3.32    0.001 0.000 0.066 
10 UKINDDB 3.83 3.35 0.114 0.118 0.118   0.368 
11 UKINFRDB 3.55 3.25    0.000 0.022 0.027 
Foreign Equity         
12 WRAIL 6.85 7.46       
13 WBANK 9.21 8.12 0.049 0.041 0.062    
14 WINFR 8.32 8.32       
15 WTEA 10.83 18.45 0.024 0.024 0.024  0.143  
Foreign Debt         
16 CLGVDB 4.15 2.24       
17 CLMUNIDB 5.25 3.22  0.068 0.080    
18 WRAILDB 5.25 2.89 0.521 0.499 0.479    
19 WINFRDB -1.68 27.14    0.000 0.007 0.000 
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Table 11 (Continued) 
Debt and Equity: Selecting 7 out of 19 Asset Classes 
Panel B: No Short-Sale Constraints 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 3 # 2 # 1 
Market: Sharpe   1.945 1.930 1.920 0.731 0.727 0.720 
Market: Mean, %   11.86 13.30 13.75 5.01 4.32 4.17 
Market: St.Dev, %   4.76 5.55 5.81 3.29 2.37 2.17 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
 
# 3 
 
# 2 
 
# 1 
UK Equity         
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77 -0.460 -0.295 -0.312 -0.309  -0.096 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.391 0.616 0.733    
3 UKLIND 10.64 8.84 0.535 0.668 0.755    
4 UKHVIND 9.56 9.95       
5 UKINFRA 6.74 8.07       
UK Preferred         
6 UKRAILP 4.56 3.96    1.030 0.287 0.525 
7 UKINDP 5.70 4.75       
UK Debt         
8 UKMUNIDB 3.71 2.37    0.654 1.012 0.962 
9 UKRAILDB 3.79 3.32  -1.719 -1.259 -0.424 -0.605 -0.635 
10 UKINDDB 3.83 3.35     0.331 0.327 
11 UKINFRDB 3.55 3.25 -1.341  -0.853 -0.070 -0.047 -0.064 
Foreign Equity         
12 WRAIL 6.85 7.46 -0.536 -0.584 -0.412    
13 WBANK 9.21 8.12  0.338     
14 WINFR 8.32 8.32 0.381      
15 WTEA 10.83 18.45    0.110 0.039  
Foreign Debt         
16 CLGVDB 4.15 2.24       
17 CLMUNIDB 5.25 3.22       
18 WRAILDB 5.25 2.89 2.030 1.976 2.349    
19 WINFRDB -1.68 27.14    0.008 -0.017 -0.019 
          
 
Asset Classes: (1) UKRAIL – UK Railways; (2) UKFIN – UK Banks and Insurance; (3) UKLIND – UK Light 
Industry and Commerce: (a) Textiles, (b) Oldham cotton spinners; (c) Food, (d) Drink, (e) Retail stores; (4) 
UKHVIND – UK Heavy Industry: (a) Iron, coal, steel, and heavy fabrication, (b) Mechanical equipment, (c) 
Electrical equipment, (d) Building and Construction materials, (e) Chemicals; (5) UKINFRA – UK Infrastructure 
(Social overhead): (a) Electricity, (b) Gas, (c) Water, (d) Canals and Docs, (e) Shipping, (f) Telephone and 
Telegraph, (g) Tramways and Omnibuses; (6) UKRAILP – UK Railways, Preferred Shares; (7) UKINDP – UK 
Manufacturing and Commerce preferred shares; (8) UKMUNIDB – UK Municipals; (9) UKRAILDB – UK 
Railways; (10) UKINDDB – Manufacturing and Commerce debt; (11) UKINFRDB – UK Infrastructure (Social 
overhead) debt; (12) WRAIL – World railways: (a) Indian, (b) Western European, (c) Eastern European, (d) U.S. 
Railways, (e) Latin American Railways; (13) WBANK – World Banks equity: (a) Asia and Australasia, (b) South 
Africa, (c) Canada, (d) Eastern Mediterranean, (e) Latin America; (14) WINFR – World Infrastructure (Social 
Overhead): (a) India and China, (b) Western Europe, (c) North America, (d) Latin America; (15) WTEA – World 
Tea and Coffee; (16) CLGVDB – Debt of Colonial and Provisional Governments: (a) Australia, (b) Canada, (c) 
India, (d) Jamaica, (e) New Zealand, (f) South Africa; (17) CLMUNIDB – Debt of Colonial municipals; (18) 
WRAILDB – Debt of World Railways: (a) Indian railways, (b) Canadian Railways, (c) W. European railways, (d) E. 
European railways, (e) U.S. railways, (f) Latin American Railways; (19) WINFRDB – Debt, World infrastructure 
(Social Overhead). 
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Table 12 
Debt and Equity: Selecting 7 out of 19 Asset Classes 
Expected Return on Foreign Asset Classes Equal Corresponding UK Return 
 
Panel A: Constrained Optimization 
    Top 3 Portfolios Worst 3 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 
 50,386 
# 
50,387 
# 
50388 
Market: Sharpe   1.149 1.147 1.147 0.456 0.445 0.425 
Market: Mean, %   7.99 7.92 7.99 3.75 3.79 3.84 
Market: St.Dev, %   4.69 4.64 4.70 2.53 2.67 2.92 
          
    Portfolio Weights 
 
No. 
Asset 
Class 
Mean 
(%) 
St.Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
# 
 50,386 
# 
50,387 
# 
50388 
UK Equity         
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77    0.000 0.003 0.000 
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31 0.242 0.237 0.254    
3 UKLIND 10.64 8.84 0.340 0.350 0.360    
4 UKHVIND 9.56 9.95 0.041      
5 UKINFRA 6.74 8.07   0.000    
UK Preferred         
6 UKRAILP 4.56 3.96       
7 UKINDP 5.70 4.75  0.032     
UK Debt         
8 UKMUNIDB 3.71 2.37       
9 UKRAILDB 3.79 3.32    0.231 0.350 0.456 
10 UKINDDB 3.83 3.35 0.162 0.156 0.160    
11 UKINFRDB 3.55 3.25    0.000 0.000 0.015 
Foreign Equity         
12 WRAIL 4.66 
(6.85) 7.46 0.123   0.000 0.000 0.104 
13 WBANK 7.48 
(9.21) 8.12  0.136 0.136    
14 WINFR 6.74 
(8.32) 8.32       
15 WTEA 10.64 
(10.83) 18.45 0.044 0.043 0.044    
Foreign Debt         
16 CLGVDB 2.06 
(4.15) 2.24    0.017 0.000 0.000 
17 CLMUNIDB 3.71  
(5.25) 3.22    0.227  0.416 
18 WRAILDB 3.79 
(5.25) 2.89    0.525 0.634  
19 WINFRDB 6.74 
(-1.68) 27.14 0.049 0.045 0.046  0.012 0.008 
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Table 12 (Continued) 
Debt and Equity: Selecting 7 out of 19 Asset Classes 
Expected Return on Foreign Asset Classes Equal Corresponding UK Return  
Panel B: No Short-Sale Constraints 
    Top 7 Portfolios 
    # 1 # 2 # 3 # 4 # 5 # 6 # 7 
Market: Sharpe   1.700 1.622 1.620 1.615 1.611 1.610 1.605 
Market: Mean, %   50.86 18.02 15.69 46.72 50.94 86.20 44.36 
Market: St.Dev, %   28.40 9.50 8.08 27.31 29.99 51.92 26.03 
           
    Portfolio Weights 
 
No. 
 
Asset 
Class 
 
Mean 
(%) 
St. 
Dev. 
(%) 
 
# 1 
 
# 2 
 
# 3 
 
# 4 
 
# 5 
 
# 6 
 
# 7 
UK Equity          
1 UKRAIL 4.66 8.77 -1.445  -0.46 -1.12 -1.49 -2.40  
2 UKFIN 7.48 6.31  1.00 1.05    3.65 
3 UKLIND 10.64 8.84  1.23 1.04    3.46 
4 UKHVIND 9.56 9.95 2.609   2.07 2.41 4.09  
5 UKINFRA 6.74 8.07     1.02   
UK Preferred          
6 UKRAILP 4.56 3.96        
7 UKINDP 5.70 4.75    1.55    
UK Debt          
8 UKMUNIDB 3.71 2.37 13.843   11.20 12.53 27.31  
9 UKRAILDB 3.79 3.32  -2.99 -2.16    -8.58 
10 UKINDDB 3.83 3.35 2.818   2.31 3.10 5.38  
11 UKINFRDB 3.55 3.25        
Foreign Equity          
12 WRAIL 4.66 
(6.85) 7.46 -2.227 -1.37 -0.94    -3.04 
13 WBANK 7.48 
(9.21) 8.12 3.859 0.91 0.57 2.45 2.61 4.84 1.57 
14 WINFR 6.74 
(8.32) 8.32        
15 WTEA 10.64 
(10.83) 18.45        
Foreign Debt          
16 CLGVDB 2.06 
(4.15) 2.24 -18.46   -17.5 -19.16 -37.7  
17 CLMUNIDB 3.71  
(5.25) 3.22       -3.41 
18 WRAILDB 3.79 
(5.25) 2.89  2.07 1.89    7.34 
19 WINFRDB 6.74 
(-1.68) 27.14  0.15    
-0.54 
  
           
 
Expected returns in boldface are the returns on UK investments that are used in the calculations; the numbers in 
parenthesis are the true returns on the overseas investments.  
 
Asset Classes: Identical to Table 11.  
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Figure 1 
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Mean-Variance frontier constructed with UK Assets only (blue) and with UK and Foreign Assets 
(red). UK-Only frontier is constructed using three asset classes: UK Equity, UK Preferred, and 
UK Debt. UK and Foreign frontier contains three UK asset classes and adds Foreign Equity and 
Foreign Debt. Data is from Edelstein, 1982. Returns on the asset classes are given in Edelstein, 
Table 5.5, p. 126. 
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Figure 2 
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Constrained optimization: investments in all assets are constrained to be positive (no short sales 
allowed). 
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Figure 3 
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Unconstrained optimization: minimum-variance frontier constructed with the best sub-set of 
seven asset classes selected from eleven UK Equity asset classes and the frontier constructed 
with the best seven assets selected from eleven UK Equity asset classes and four foreign equity 
asset classes. The best subsets are found by selecting the sub-set of 7 out of 11 assets (and 7 out 
of 15 assets) that results in the highest Sharpe ratio for the market portfolio. 
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Figure 4 
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Unconstrained optimization: minimum-variance frontier constructed with the best sub-set of 
seven asset classes selected from eleven UK asset classes (UK Equity, UK Preferred, UK Debt) 
and the frontier constructed with the best seven assets selected from nineteen UK and Foreign 
asset classes. The best subsets are found by selecting the sub-set of 7 out of 11 assets for the UK-
only case (and 7 out of 19 assets for the UK and Foreign case) that results in the highest Sharpe 
ratio for the market portfolio. There are 50,388 possible ways of selecting 7 different asset 
classes from 19. 
 
 
Appendix A 
Charts of Security Prices from Lowenfeld (1907) 
 
 
 
